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The Allais Paradox represents one of the earliest empirical challenges to normative models
of decision-making, and suggests that choices in one part of a gamble may depend on
the possible outcome in another, independent, part of the gamble—a violation of the
so-called “independence axiom.” To account for Allaisian behavior, one well-known class
of models propose that individuals’ choices are influenced not only by possible outcomes
resulting from one’s choices, but also the anticipation of regret for foregone options.
Here we test the regret hypothesis using a population of patients with behavioral variant
frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), a clinical population known to present ventromedial
prefrontal cortex dysfunctions and associated with impaired regret processing in previous
studies of decision-making. Compared to matched controls and Alzheimer’s disease (AD)
patients, we found a striking diminution of Allaisian behavior among bvFTD patients. These
results are consistent with the regret hypothesis and furthermore suggest a crucial role
for prefrontal regions in choices that typically stands in contradiction with a basic axiom of
rational decision-making.
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INTRODUCTION
In the Allais paradox, an individual is asked tomake two decisions
corresponding to two sets of prospects. The first decision involves
a choice between the following Lotteries A and B.
– Lottery A: The player receives 500,000 C with 100% of
certainty.
– Lottery B: The player receives 500,000 C with a chance of 89%
or 2,500,000 C with a chance of 10% and gets nothing with a
chance of 1%.
Then a second decision is made regarding Lotteries C and D:
– Lottery C: The player gets 500,000 C with a chance of 11% and
gets nothing with a chance of 89%.
– Lottery D: The player gets 2,500,000 C with a chance of 10%
and nothing with a chance of 90%.
Behaviorally, there is substantial evidence that most individuals
prefer A over B then D over C. These, however, are choices that
violate standard expected utility theory. If one computes expected
payoffs for the above lotteries, it is clear that:
– E(A) = (0.89 + 0.10 + 0.01) × 500, 000 = 500, 000;
– E(B) = 0.10 × 2, 500, 000 + 0.89 × 500, 000 = 695, 000;
– E(C) = (0.10 + 0.01) × 500, 000 = 55, 000;
– E(D) = 0.10 × 2, 500, 000 = 250, 000.
Thus, a subject is said to exhibit a preference reversal when they
move from the lottery [A, B] to the lottery [C, D]. More precisely,
they violate a basic assumption of the well-orderliness of prefer-
ences and challenge the idea that there exists a well-behaved utility
function underlying choice behavior.
In particular, the choice pattern observed with respect to the
above Allais choices presents a violation of Savage’s sure thing
principle or, alternatively, as a violation of the independence
axiom central to subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954).
This axiom states that if p is preferred over p′, this preference con-
tinues to hold up to any linear transformation such that αp +
(1 − α)p′′ > αp′ + (1 − α)p′′. In simpler terms, the sure thing
principle states that when an outcome is irrelevant, it should
not be taken into account in decision-making. As put by Allais
in retrospect (Allais, 1953), this principle may be incompatible
with the preference for security in the neighborhood of certainty,
which is reflected by the elimination of all strategies implying a
non-negligible probability of ruin (so B is generally discarded in
favor of A).
Allais points here to a psychological process underlying the
violation of independence. The certainty or quasi-certainty effect
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) is indeed one of the prevailing
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explanations of the Allais paradox. More precisely, it states that
when among several options a sure or quasi-certain one is pre-
sented, the choice is biased toward that option in spite of a
consequent violation of utility maximization or of preferences
consistency. Another explanation has been but in terms of regret-
theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982, 1987). The idea is that, when
making decisions, individuals take into account not only the con-
sequences they might experience as results of the action chosen,
but also how each consequence compares with what they would
have experienced under the same state of the world, had they cho-
sen differently. Their satisfaction then undergoes an increment
or a decrement according to how much regret or rejoicing they
anticipate they will experience when they are in a position to ret-
rospectively compare between what they get and what they could
have gotten. These two explanations are not rival and exclusive,
in the sense that they jointly point to an effect, possibly of an
elaborate affective and cognitive nature such as the anticipation
of regret, of sure gains on deflecting people from strictly utility
maximizing choices.
Unlike basic emotions such as fear or happiness, regret is a
cognitively-based emotion, stemming from the individual feel-
ing of responsibility with respect to the outcome of one’s own
choice (Canessa et al., 2009). Studies of the neural bases of regret
tend to show a ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) involve-
ment through the use of different paradigms and methodologies
(for a review, see Sommer et al., 2009). Using a decision-making
task in which choices between two risky monetary gambles were
required, Camille et al. (2004) investigated whether the presence
of the feedback about the potential outcome of the unchosen
option in a binary choice could lead to a difference in the emo-
tional appraisal of the actual outcome of the chosen option
and whether this feedback influenced the choice strategy for
subsequent decisions across their experiment.
The authors observed that unlike controls, patients with
VMPFC lesions were not influenced by the outcome of the fore-
gone option and reported no regret when learning they could
have obtained a better outcome. Using the same paradigm in
a functional imaging study on healthy controls, Coricelli et al.
(2005) showed that the degree of regret covaried with activity
within the VMPFC as well as in the dorsal anterior cingulate.
Consistently, the VMPFC activation was reported during the
specific experience of regret (by contrast with simple “disappoint-
ment” about what you get in a situation when do not in fact
compare with what you could have gotten) during a decision-
related loss task (Chua et al., 2009). VMPFC again, as well as
putamen, have furthermore been linked, in an electrophysio-
logical study, to the so-called “near-miss effect” in gambling
outcomes (Qi et al., 2011). While the decision-making process
depends on multiple factors such as attitude toward risk, con-
text, or outcome representation, it seems clear that regret plays
an important role in normal rewarded decision-making and that
VMPFC acts as a key node in the normal processing of this emo-
tion (Shiv et al., 2005; Fellows and Farah, 2007; Sommer et al.,
2009).
Thus, if an affective and cognitive process, such as regret-
anticipation, plays a role in accounting for the Allais paradox, it is
supported by psychological mechanisms that are in turn encoded
by a specific neural structure. In this respect our study is, in
its principle, congenial to studies on decision-patient behavior
among VMPFC patients such as Shiv et al. (2005), and Fellows
and Farah’s (2007). In order to test our more particular hypothe-
sis with respect to the Allais paradox, we investigate the extent to
which Allaisian behavior is affected in patients suffering from a
neurodegenerative disease considered as a prototype of VMPFC
dysfunctions: the behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia
(bvFTD). bvFTD is characterized by hypometabolism and atro-
phy in frontal and polar temporal lobes (Schroeter et al., 2008;
Seeley et al., 2008; Agosta et al., 2012), particularly in the medial
and ventro-medial parts of the prefrontal cortex (Boccardi et al.,
2005; Perry et al., 2006; Schroeter et al., 2007). Given our interest
in understanding the involvement of regret in the Allais para-
dox, bvFTD is a natural choice since (1) it is considered as a
model of VMPFC and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) dys-
functions (Lu et al., 2006; Zald and Andreotti, 2010) and (2)
that emotional processing impairments have been consistently
described in this disease (Bertoux et al., 2012, 2013). As a patho-
logical control group, we decided to administrate this Allais task
to mild Alzheimer’s disease (AD) patients, in which VMPFC and
mPFC integrity has been described as spared (Rabinovici et al.,
2007; Tranfaglia et al., 2009), as well as emotional processing
(Funkiewiez et al., 2012; Bertoux et al., 2013, 2014a). Finally, we
contrasted both groups to age and education matched healthy
controls.
We studied Allaisian behavior in participants using a set of
sequential choices with no feedback and hypothetical payoffs.
Thus, unlike a number of other studies, our focus was not whether
subjects were going to maximize their own payoffs, but in terms
of consistency across series of choices. In particular, whereas pay-
offs fluctuates across different environments, choice consistency
as defined under subjective expected utility theory provides a
much more general test of rationality in the sense of guaranteeing
utility-maximization in expectation.
In the first phase, participants chose between pairs of invest-
ments (lotteries) that were successively presented to each par-
ticipant. Each investment was described by a list of potential
gains (or losses) and the associated probability (for example: 50%
chance of earning 750$, 50% chance of earning nothing). Pairs
of investments presented were sufficiently contrasted so that the
participants were likely to express their choice on the basis of a
criterion such as anticipated regret.
In a second phase, participants made similar choices between
two pairs of investments, but were also presented with what out-
come would have occurred if they had made the other choice,
and were asked to rate their satisfaction with the actual outcome.
Under the regret hypothesis, we should observe significantly
fewer cases of Allaisian patterns and less sensitivity to potential
outcomes in bvFTD patients, due to their deficits in emotion
processing.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
A total of 14 bvFTD patients and 13 AD patients in the early or
moderate stages of the disease, and 12 age and education matched
controls were recruited for the study. All bvFTD and AD patients
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience September 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 287 | 2
Bertoux et al. bvFTD and Allais paradox
were seen and evaluated at theMemory and Alzheimer Institute of
the Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris, France. The final diagnosis
was established by experts after multidisciplinary clinical syn-
thesis based on neuropsychological, neurological, biological and
neuroimaging evidences. bvFTD patients were enrolled according
to the revised Lund and Manchester criteria for bvFTD diagnosis
(Neary et al., 1998) and fulfilled the new revised diagnostic cri-
teria for “probable bvFTD” (Rascovsky et al., 2011). All patients
had prominent changes in personality and social behavior that
were established from their caregivers’ interviews. AD patients
were enrolled according to the revised NINCDS-ADRDA Criteria
(Dubois et al., 2007). They presented with a prominent history
of episodic memory impairment with temporal and spatial dis-
orientation and had a clinical dementia rating (Morris, 1993)
score ≥ 0.5.
All patients underwent a comprehensive neuropsychological
examination. Clinical MRI and/or SPECT scans were performed
for all patients and showed frontotemporal atrophy or/and
hypoperfusion for bvFTD patients and medial temporal lobe
atrophy for AD patients. Patients were excluded from the study
if they presented any of the following: (1) substantial language
production and comprehension deficits suggesting progressive
non-fluent aphasia or semantic dementia; (2) co-morbid medi-
cal conditions that could interfere with cognitive functioning; (3)
vascular lesions validated by MRI or neurological history suggest-
ing vascular dementia, and (4) motor-neuron disease. To improve
diagnostic accuracy, all patients had at least an 18-month follow-
up in the National Reference Center for Rare Dementias or in the
Resource and Research Memory Center of the Pitié-Salpêtrière
Hospital, in order to validate the diagnosis according to their
clinical evolution. Clinical and demographical data are shown on
Table 1, as well as scores in facial emotions recognition test (please
see Funkiewiez et al., 2012 for a complete description of this task).
Behaviors of patients were compared to those from twelve
age and education matched healthy controls. They were either
spouses of unrelated patients or recruited via advertisements
in the hospital. Controls were included according to the fol-
lowing criteria: (a) Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE—
Folstein et al., 1975) score > or = 27/30 and Frontal Assessment
Battery (FAB—Dubois et al., 2000) > or = 16/18; (ii) no his-
tory of neurological or psychiatric disorders; (iii) no memory
complaint or cognitive impairment; (iii) no history of drug
abuse.
This study was conducted at the National Reference Center
for Rare Dementias, and in the Neurology Department (Pitié-
Salpêtrière Hospital). All clinical data were generated during
a routine clinical work-up and were extracted for the pur-
pose of this study. According to French legislation, patients
were informed and consented that their data might be used in
retrospective clinical research studies.
Allais paradox task (first phase)
We adapted the Allais paradox to a repeated Allais task. The exper-
iment was run entirely on a computer. Two instructions screens
were first shown to participants inviting them to imagine that
they had to invest some of their money in stocks and repeatedly
make binary choices among these stocks. Then a succession of 40
choices between two possible “investments” was presented.
Experimental choices. we implemented 24 choices between two
“investments” that were sequentially displayed: one on the left
half of the screen and the second on the right half of the screen.
Each investment was described by a list of potential gains (or
losses) and the associated probability (e.g., “90% chance of earn-
ing $15,000 and 10% chance of earning nothing,” henceforth
noted: [+$15,000 (90%), $0 (10%)]). Among these experimen-
tal choices, 12 were choices between investments in which the
participants could gain money (e.g., “[+$10,000 (100%)] OR
[+$15,000 (90%), $0 (10%)]”) and 12 choices between invest-
ments in which the participants could lose money (e.g., “[−$6000
(90%), $0 (10%)] OR [−$14,000 (45%), $0 (55%)]”). To allow
comparison between gain and losses, the list of choices between
losses was the same as the list of choices between gains, except
that the word “losing” was substituted to the word “earning” (e.g.,
the choice between gains “[+$10,000 (100%)] OR [+$15,000
(90%), $0 (10%)]” became the choice between losses “[−$10,000
(100%)] OR [−$15,000 (90%), $0 (10%)]”). For each choice,
the experimenter made sure that participants were fully aware
of the probabilities. After the choice, no feedback was provided
about the outcome of the investment. The choices had different
properties that are detailed below.
First property. High probabilities vs. Low probabilities choices:
each experimental choice had a “twin” supposed to be equiv-
alent from the standpoint of the sure thing principle (e.g., the
equivalent for “[+$10,000 (100%)] OR [+$15,000 (90%), $0
(10%)]” was “[+$10,000 (10%), $0 (90%)] OR [+$15,000 (9%),
$0 (91)]”). Thus, we had a total of 12 pairs of choices between
two investments (6 pairs of choices among potential gains and
6 pairs of choices among potential losses). Within each pair of
choices, one choice presented high probabilities (e.g., “[+$10,000
(100%)] OR [+$15,000 (90%), $0 (10%)]”), with a potential gain
(or loss) in the neighborhood of certainty, and one choice pre-
sented low probabilities (e.g., “[+$10,000 (10%), $0 (90%)] OR
[+$15,000 (9%), $0 (91)]”), with no potential gain (or loss) in
the neighborhood of certainty.
Table 1 | Clinical and demographic data for the participants.
Groups Sex ratio (F/M) Age Education (years) MMSE (/30) FAB (/18) Facial emotions recognition (%)*
bvFTD 6/8 66.7 (9.1) 10.9 (3.9) 24.1 (2.3) 12.4 (2) 40% (11.9)
AD 7/6 78.2 (7.5) 11.3 (3.7) 23.7 (3.2) 14.2 (2.4) 87.5% (8.7)
Controls 8/4 68 (7.5) 11.6 (2.9) 28.9 (0.9) 17.4 (0.5) N.A.
Mean (Standard deviation). F/M = Female/Male. *Norm for this test is 83.2% (7.47) from Bertoux et al. (2013).
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Second property. Secure vs. Risky investments: for both kinds
of choices (high or low probabilities), one investment pre-
sented higher probabilities (of gain or loss) than the other.
From now on, we call the secure investment the investment
with higher probabilities and the risky investment the investment
with lower probabilities (see Figure 1). (For example, in the high
probabilities choice “[+$10,000 (100%)] OR [+$15,000 (90%),
$0 (10%)],” [+$10,000 (100%)] is the secure investment and
[+$15,000 (90%), $0 (10%)] is the risky investment. Similarly,
in the low probabilities choice “[+$10,000 (10%), $0 (90%)]
OR [+$15,000 (9%), $0 (91)],” [+$10,000 (10%), $0 (90%)] is
the secure investment, while [+$15,000 (9%), $0 (91)] is the
risky investment.) For all choices, the expected gain (or loss)
was higher for the risky investment. For half of the choices,
the secure investment had a lower expected utility than the
risky investment, while expected utilities were matched for the
other half.
Allaisian scores. To quantify Allasian behavior, we compared
choices in pairs of trials that are equivalent according to the sure
thing principle, with one choice featuring a potential gain (or
loss) in the neighborhood of certainty (the choice between high
probabilities) and the other at distance from certainty (the choice
between low probabilities). This allows us to define Allaisian
behavior in an operational way. First, for choices among gains,
Allaisian behavior consists in choosing more frequently the secure
investment in the high probabilities choices than in the low proba-
bilities choices. Second, for choices among losses, Allaisian behav-
ior consists in choosing more frequently the risky investment in
the high probabilities choices than in the low probabilities choices.
This behavioral pattern then corresponds to the modal choice
[A, D] in the original matrix presented above. We characterize
Allaisian behavior by the occurrence of such a choice pattern in
our task.
FIGURE 1 | Two sample pairs of choices between gains. On top (A),
patients have to choose between a risky investment (left) and a secure
investment (right) in a high probabilities lottery. Below (B), patients have to
choose between risky investment (left) and a secure investment (right) in a
low probabilities lottery.
This definition of Allaisian behavior led us to attribute to each
participant two Allaisian score: one for gains and one for losses.
For gains, Allaisian score was calculated by subtracting the num-
ber of risky investment in high probability choices to the number
of risky investment in low probability choices (thus, the score
had a potential range from −6 to 6). For losses, Allaisian score
was calculated by subtracting the number of risky investments in
low probability choices from the number of risky investment in
high probability choices (again, the score had a potential range
from −6 to 6).
Control trials. The first four choices of the task were considered
as forming a training phase and 12 others were control choices
(6 in gains, 6 in losses), in which the investment with the high-
est expected utility was designed to be the most attractive, either
because one choice presented a much higher potential gain or loss
(“[±$100 (90%), $0 (10%)] OR [±$1000 (65%), $0 (35%)]”),
or because one choice presented much higher probabilities of
gain or loss (“[±$3000 (20%), $0 (80%)] OR [±$2000 (80%),
$0 (20%)]”), or both (“[±$750 (50%), $0 (50%)] OR [±$1000
(90%), $0 (10%)]”).
A person exhibiting Allaisian behavior will choose the secure
investment among the two “high probabilities” investments, but
will choose the risky investment among the two “low probabili-
ties” investments, though both choices are equivalent according
to the principle of independence.
REGRET TASK (SECOND PHASE)
The regret task was presented in a way similar to the Allais task
and participants had to make a series of 18 choices between two
investments. In each choice, one investment (the secure invest-
ment) presented a high probability of small gain and a small
probability of high loss (e.g., [+$500 (80%), −$500 (20%)]) and
the other investment (the risky investment) presented a small
probability of a high gain and a high probability of a high loss
(e.g., [+$2000 (20%), −$2000 (80%)] “20% chance of earn-
ing $2000” and “80% chance of losing $2000”). Choices were
designed such as participants would normally tend to prefer the
secure investment.
However, announced probabilities were not accurate: both
the secure and the risky investments had a 50% chance to lead
to announced gain and a 50% chance to lead to announced
loss. Thus, participants made their choice without being aware
of these true probabilities. After each choice, participants were
first announced what they had earned (or lost) and then what
they would have earned (or lost) if they had chosen the other
investment. Finally, participants had to tell whether they were
“happy” with their choice’s outcome, by indicating their level of
satisfaction on a scale ranging from −4 (“NO”) to 4 (“YES”).
For phase 1 and 2 of the test, to avoid any stereotypical or per-
severation answer, patients were invited to choose which choice
they want to make and a trained clinician (MB) clicked on the
selected choice.
HYPOTHESES
Our hypothesis with respect to the Allais task was that bvFTD
patients would display less Allaisian behavior than control
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participants and AD patients, i.e., FTD patients would show
a significantly lesser discrepancy between their choices in high
probabilities and low probabilities, as measured by Allaisian
scores.
Concerning the regret task, our hypothesis was that bvFTD
patients would show less regret than control participants and AD
patients, i.e., their level of satisfaction with one’s actual gain (or
loss) would be less sensitive to one’s potential gain (or loss) for
FTD patients than for control participants and AD patients.
RESULTS
DEMOGRAPHICS AND NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND DATA
Demographics of all participants are shown in Table 1. These
non-normal variables were tested with Mann-Whitney non-
parametric test. The three groups didn’t differ on educational
level (p > 0.1). Age was significantly higher in the Alzheimer
group (K = 15.59; p < 0.01) compared to the two other groups
that were not different between each other (p > 0.1). MMSE and
FAB scores were significantly higher in the control groups com-
pared with the bvFTD patients and the AD patient (respectively
K = 21.77; p < 0.001 and K = 23.91; p < 0.001). Both patient
groups did not differ on the MMSE, but were significantly differ-
ent on the FAB with bvFTD showing significantly more frontal
dysfunction than AD patients (Z = −2.10; p < 0.05). Finally,
bvFTD patients showed an impairment in emotion recognition
compared to AD (Z = −3.15; p < 0.0001) who exhibited normal
scores at this test [Controls from Bertoux et al., 2014a, obtained
82.5% of good recognition (7.6)].
ALLAIS TASK: ALLAISIAN BEHAVIOR (FIGURE 2)
First, we compared how Allaisian scores difference across groups
and conditions. Given that each participant had two scores (one
for gains and one for losses), we applied a 3 (group of participants:
control, AD, or bvFTD; between-subjects) × 2 (condition: gains,
or losses; within-subjects) ANOVA to Allaisian scores. We found
a main effect of group of participants [F(2, 36) = 10.5, p < 0.001]
but no main effect of condition [F(2, 36) = 0.0, p = 0.99] and no
interaction effect [F(2, 36) = 4.9, p = 0.16].
FIGURE 2 | Allaisian scores in function of group of participants and
condition (error bars indicate standard error).
The effect of group was due to bvFTD patients having lower
scores than control participants and AD patients (see Figure 3).
After summing scores for gains and losses into a single score,
we proceeded to pairwise comparison for all three groups using
Student t-tests. There was no difference between control partic-
ipants and AD patients (N = 25, t = −1.1, df = 23, p = 0.29),
but we found a significant difference between both control partic-
ipants and bvFTD patients (N = 26, t = 3.6, df = 24, p < 0.01)
and AD patients and bvFTD patients (N = 27, t = 4.5, df = 25,
p < 0.001).
ALLAIS TASK: CONTROL TRIALS AND RISK AVERSION
An alternative explanation of our results is that bvFTD patients
had comprehension and/or motivational differences compared to
other participants. For example, more random behavior would
lead to lower Allaisian scores. To test for this hypothesis, we ana-
lyzed participants’ answers to control trials, with the percentage
of choices in which each participant chose the investment with
the highest expected value as a dependent variable.
For gains, a ANOVA with group of participants as a factor and
percentage of maximizing choices as a dependent variable revealed
no significant difference: F(2, 36) = 0.2, p = 0.82. bvFTD patients
made mostly maximizing choices (M = 0.75), and no signifi-
cantly less than control participants (M = 0.79) and AD patients
(M = 0.75).
For losses, a ANOVA with group of participants as a factor and
percentage of maximizing choices as a dependent variable revealed
no significant difference: F(2, 36) = 2.2, p = 0.12. bvFTD patients
made mostly maximizing choices (M = 0.61), and though they
tended to make less than control participants (M = 0.74) and AD
patients (M = 0.81), this difference did not reach statistical sig-
nificance. Thus, it does not seem that our results can be explained
by the random behavior of bvFTD patients.
Another possibility would be that bvFTD patients were less
risk averse than control participants and AD patients. To test
for this alternative hypothesis, we analyzed the number of risky
FIGURE 3 | Number of risky investments in the experimental trials of
the Allais task in function of group of participants and condition (error
bars indicate standard error).
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investments chosen by participants for both experimental choices
between gains and experimental choices between losses (see
Figure 3 for a presentation of the results). We applied a 3 (group of
participants: control, AD, or bvFTD; between-subjects) × 2 (con-
dition: gains, or losses; within-subjects) ANOVA to the number of
risky investments per subject. It revealed a significant main effect
of condition [F(1, 36) = 7.9, p < 0.01], with participants mak-
ing less risky decision in gains than in losses, which is consistent
with previous literature on the subject (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Weller et al., 2007). However, there was no main effect of
group of participants [F(2, 36) = 0.1, p = 0.95], suggesting that
bvFTD patients were no less risk averse than control participants
and AD patients. Finally, we also found a significant trend in the
interaction effect [F(2, 36) = 2.9, p = 0.07], due to the fact that
bvFTD patients tended to make no less risky choices in gains than
in losses (M = 6.43 vs. M = 6.21) while there was such a trend
in control participants (M = 4.5 vs. M = 7.67) and AD patients
(M = 5 vs. M = 7.54). This suggests that bvFTD patients were
not subject to the framing effect that led control participants and
AD patients to treat choices between gains and choices between
losses differently.
REGRET TASK (FIGURE 4)
In the regret task, we found that bvFTD patients chose the risky
investment more often (40% of choices) than control partici-
pants (14%) and AD patients (09%). A chi-square test revealed
this difference to be statistically significant: χ2(1, N = 602) = 82.08,
p < 0.001. This suggests that bvFTD patients were more likely to
choose the risky investment in the specific situation when faced
with a choice between a risky investment and a quasi-certainty of
earning something.
Because control participants and AD patients chose mainly the
secure investment, we discarded from analysis the trials in which
participants chose the risky investment, keeping only the trials in
which participants chose the secure investment. Then we used a
three-factor repeated measures ANOVA with satisfaction ratings
FIGURE 4 | Satisfaction ratings in function of potential gains (+$2000
or −$2000) for each group of participants (error bars indicate standard
error).
as a dependent variable and actual gain ($500 or −$500), poten-
tial gain ($2000 or −$2000) and group of participants (control
participants, AD patients of FTD patients) as factors. We found
a main effect of actual gain [F(1, 30) = 46.5, p < 0.001], with par-
ticipants giving higher ratings when their actual gain was $500
rather than −$500, a main effect of potential gain [F(1, 32) =
18.2, p < 0.001], with participants giving higher ratings when
their potential gain was −$2000 rather than $2000, and no main
effect of group of participants [F(2, 27) = 0.3, p = 0.74]. We did
not found the expected interaction between potential gain and
group of participants [F(2, 32) = 0.4, p = 0.68], nor an interac-
tion between actual gain and group of participants [F(2, 30) = 1.5,
p = 0.24], suggesting that bvFTD patients did not differ from
other participants in how potential and actual gains affected their
satisfaction.
However, we found a significant interaction between actual
gain and potential gain [F(1, 31) = 15.8, p < 0.001]: potential
gains had a greater impact on participants’ ratings when actual
gain was −$500 than when actual gain was $500. Finally, we
found a significant interaction effect between our three fac-
tors [F(2, 31) = 4.3, p < 0.05]: while control participants and AD
patients tended to be more sensitive to potential gains for an
actual gain of −$500, bvFTD patients were as sensitive to poten-
tial gains for an actual gain of $500. Thus, we did find a difference
between bvFTD patients and control participants and AD patients
but it was not the one we expected: overall, bvFTD patients did
not seem to be less sensitive to potential gains but were differently
sensitive to them, taking them into account both for an actual
gain and an actual loss, while control participants and ADpatients
seemed to take potential gains more into account in case of an
actual loss.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to test the extent to which Allaisian
behavior is influenced by emotional anticipation. Anticipated
regret, in particular, has played a central role in a number of
influential models of decision-making seeking to clarify the cog-
nitive and affective processes that underlie Allaisian behavior, and
more generally violations of the independence axiom (Bell, 1982;
Loomes and Sugden, 1982, 1987; Quiggin, 1994). Based on these
works and recent findings from neuroscience, we hypothesized
that bvFTD patients would exhibit diminished Allaisian tenden-
cies due to the associated VMPFC dysfunctions and emotional
impairments (Bertoux et al., 2012, 2013, 2014a).
Consistent with our prediction, bvFTD was associated with
significantly lower Allaisian scores relative to controls and AD
patients. Thus, unlike controls and AD patients, who demon-
strated a normal violation of the independence axiom and have
shown the typical decision inconsistency described by Allais,
bvFTD patients were more likely to conform to a basic tenet
of rational decision-theoretical behavior. That is, those very
same patients who have been previously described to exhibit
“irrationality” in terms of an incapacity to maximize their
gains in decision-making tasks such as the Iowa Gambling Task
(Torralva et al., 2007), are “rational” (albeit in contradiction
with the rest of the population) in terms of consistency of
choices.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience September 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 287 | 6
Bertoux et al. bvFTD and Allais paradox
Unlike a number of other gambling tasks, these findings
cannot be explained in terms of differences in risk attitude,
as Allaisian behavior violates subjective expected utility theory
regardless of one’s risk attitude. Our findings therefore are in line
with previous findings in framing effects and ambiguity aversion
that suggest a role for medial prefrontal cortex in detecting and
responding to contextual information that result in violation of
standard expected utility theory predictions (Hsu et al., 2005; De
Martino et al., 2006).
Thus, unlike controls and AD patients, who demonstrated a
normal violation of the independence axiom and have shown
the typical decision inconsistency described by Allais, bvFTD
patients were more likely to conform to a basic tenet of rational
decision-theoretical behavior.
Furthermore, we assessed whether bvFTD patients were sig-
nificantly different in terms of their subjective assessment of
post-hoc regret. Interestingly, in spite of significantly diminished
Allaisian tendencies, we found that bvFTDs appeared to exhibit
intact post-hoc regret as assessed using self-report. That is, we
did not observe significant differences between bvFTD and AD
or controls participants, in terms of apparent asymmetric sensi-
tivity to gains and losses. Thus, the results observed in bvFTD
about the Allais behavior cannot be straightforwardly linked to
bvFTD patients’ lack of regret, as we didn’t find a significant asso-
ciation between bvFTD patients’ sensitivity to potential gains or
losses (a behavioral measure of regret) and control participants’
sensitivity.
The divergence between Allaisian behavior on the one
hand, and regret on the other, raises a number of interest-
ing hypotheses regarding their relationship. First, it is pos-
sible that anticipated regret is not a necessary feature of
Allaisian behavior. That is, the fact that bvFTD patients exhibited
Allaisian behavior while at the same time had intact regret-
processing suggests that some other processes underlie Allaisian
behavior.
While this study did not provide direct evidence of VMPFC
atrophy in bvFTD patients we choose to explore the Allais para-
dox in bvFTD patients because of its well-known VMPFC dys-
functions in this disease (Boccardi et al., 2005; Perry et al., 2006;
Schroeter et al., 2007, 2008; Schroeter, 2012; Bertoux et al., 2013)
have led to consider this disease as a good model to study VMPFC
functioning (Lu et al., 2006; Zald and Andreotti, 2010) even if
the atrophy affects more dorsal median and lateral frontal and
temporal areas through the progression of the disease (Agosta
et al., 2012). Among the clinical or imaging studies that have
investigated the role of VMPFC in the experience of regret,
Camille et al. (2004) was the first to make investigate the corre-
lation between this particular frontal area and subjective report
of a regret-like emotion in a task liable to arouse it. In that
seminal study, subjects needed to choose between two gambles
for which the outcome probabilities were indicated. After the
choice, depending on the condition, the outcome of the cho-
sen option was uniquely presented only or the two outcomes
of the chosen and foregone options were displayed (regret con-
dition). At the end of each trial, subjects were asked to rate
their affective state and their skin conductance response was
recorded. In the regret condition, by contrast with controls, when
patients, the effect of the unobtained outcome was not significant
and the emotions they expressed were not modulated by the
feedback information concerning the unchosen gamble, leading
the authors to conclude that VMPFC patients experienced no
regret.
In our study, we investigated how degeneration in brain
regions implicated in regret processing impacts Allaisian behav-
ior. Although the observed absence of Allaisian behavior in
bvFTD patients suggests a VMPFC involvement, we cannot sim-
ply conclude that the behavioral pattern exhibited by our patients
in this study can be explained by the fact that they do not
experience anticipated regret, given that there is no significant
difference in the way our different groups perform with our
regret task. The absence of Allaisian behavior in bvFTD was
not significantly correlated with the absence of verbal reports
of regret on a control task. This divergent result, however,
does not dismiss the hypothesis that emotional impairment—
whether it is specified in terms of absence of anticipated regret
or in other possible less determined terms such as lack of
hedonic anticipation or satisfaction associated with future pos-
sible outcomes—affects the type of decision made by patients
in our Allais task. We must precisely account for a behavioral
pattern that shows that the absence of emotional processing
associated with VMPFC functions leads to atypical decision
behavior in a binary-lotteries task contrasting levels of cer-
tainty.
It is possible that bvFTD patients’ answers to the satisfaction
question in the regret task should not be taken at face value.
Indeed, even if bvFTD patients did not experience regret, they can
still have an explicit representation of regret and of how potential
gains or loss are supposed to impact their satisfaction. A salient
possibility, therefore, is that bvFTD patients experienced regret in
the regret task but failed to anticipate regret (in the Allais task).
Finally, the atrophic pattern is variable among bvFTD, and
we cannot exclude that a representation, if not an attenuated
experience of regret, was induced in the regret task in some
patients with less pronounced ventro-medial atrophy, given that
bvFTD’s answers still differed, even though not significantly, from
other participants’. Larger samples with quantitative measures of
brain degeneration patterns would be necessary to address this
important question.
Finally while this study have considered a specific neurode-
generative disease as a model of cognitive impairment to answer
to an experimental economy question, our results trend to
show that reward-based tests inspired by experimental economic
paradigms could be further adapted and employed in clinical
setting in order to enhance the differentiation between dif-
ferent conditions, such as bvFTD from AD. Considering the
recent evidences of an AD-like episodic memory impairment
in bvFTD (Hornberger et al., 2010; Bertoux et al., 2014b)
which restrained the clinical distinction between both dis-
eases, these original tests could provide crucial data that could
improve the earliness and precision of the diagnosis in the years
to come.
Moreover, it is not be reminded that the regret task induced
a subjective assessment of satisfaction which was absent from
the Allais task, which was purely decisional, not verbal and
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presenting no feedback. The Allais task was designed in a way
in which anticipated regret could play a role in the type of
decision-made (leading then to standard Allaisian behavior)
whereas the regret task focused on outcomes subjective
assessment.
A salient possibility, therefore, is that bvFTD patients expe-
rienced regret in the regret task but failed to anticipate regret
(in the Allais task). It is also to be emphasized that, like mPFC
and VMPFC lesioned patients, bvFTD patients present strong
metacognition and emotional deficits that may result in impair-
ments into insights regarding their emotional states (Eslinger
et al., 2005; Banks andWeintraub, 2008; Hornberger et al., 2014).
Unlike in regret task where participants were repeated ask to
focus on their feelings, no such opportunity was present in the
Allais task.
An alternative explanation could be put in terms of the effect
of risk aversion on decision behavior. Our results in the Allais
task showed that bvFTD’s behavior could not be explained by a
general tendency to take more risks. But we also reported that
they nevertheless tended to take more risk in the regret task,
where they faced with a choice between a risky investment and
a quasi-certainty of earning something. A natural bias toward
certain or quasi-certain gains would be lost in bvFTD’s patients.
This hypothesis is yet to be confirmed by further neuropsycho-
logical studies, but this result could consistent with previous
studies using decision-making paradigm (Rahman et al., 1999;
Torralva et al., 2007) that have shown that bvFTD were risk-
takers. Such behavior would also make sense in terms of the
role of emotions, associated with risk-aversion or risk-seeking,
that has been reported in framing-effect contexts (Kahneman
and Frederick, 2007). A framing effect is the fact that two
options which are identical in terms of their expected utility
give rise nevertheless choice to asymmetrical choice due to the
way they are framed in terms of valence. It is admissible to say
that the Allais paradox stems from a framing effect at a cer-
tain level, given the normative equivalence of the options that
nevertheless give rise to systematic divergent choices, and it is
quite plausible that elements of risk aversion when contrast-
ing a quasi-certain option with a risky one, are involved in
the type of decisions made by our patients. VMPFC activities
have been reported to be correlated with risk-averse behav-
ior in framing-effects fMRI experiments (De Martino et al.,
2006).
Finally, a third hypothesis could explain results obtained in
bvFTD patients while being linked to VMPFC dysfunctions.
Indeed, we cannot exclude that the observed pattern in the bvFTD
group could be linked to a more general reward-processing
impairment due to VMPFC atrophy, as this area has been shown
to be a key node of the brain valuation system (Rolls, 2006).
An other brain regions involved in reward-processing as well as
being atrophied in bvFTD is the ventral striatum (O’Callaghan
et al., 2014), and its dysfunctions could have led to a lack of
reward anticipation in this patient group during the comparison
of choices. While this hypothesis may not be sufficient to entirely
explain our results in the Allais task, this whole limbic-system
dysfunction could explain why bvFTD patients exhibited a risky
behavior in the regret task.
The point of regret-theory is to say that anticipated regret
(rather than subjective assessment of post-hoc regret) is what
explains the violation of the sure thing principle in the prob-
lem initially stated by Allais. This is precisely an hypothesis
that our results cannot dismiss and even tends to confirm in
the light of what is known on the emotional deficits presented
by bvFTD patients. bvFTD patients present medial and ventro-
medial atrophy that may impair their ability to envision at an
experiential level the future consequences of their risky behav-
ior. However, their lack of emotional insight (Eslinger et al., 2005;
Banks and Weintraub, 2008; Hornberger et al., 2014) and abil-
ity to learn on the basis of past negative experiences (Rahman
et al., 1999; Bertoux et al., 2012) might prevent them to fully inte-
grate regret into behavioral optimization patterns. But, at another
important level, they also behave in accordance with the norma-
tive prescription of economic rationality by actually complying
with the fundamental decision-theoretical independence axiom.
It is indeed important to note that, unlike other studies in the
field of behavioral decision-theory, our focus was not whether
subjects were going to maximize their own payoffs. It was dif-
ferently defined in terms of consistency across series of choices.
Consistency has an effect on payoffs in the long run (and actu-
ally coincides with utility-maximization), but it constitutes an
independent and fundamental dimension of rational choice. The
specific question we raised, then, is whether bvFTD patients with
VMPFC dysfunctions and healthy controls behave in the same
way with respect to making consistent choices. Ironically, the
patients were more consistent in that aspect of rationality than
their control samples. It means that those very same patients
who have been previously described to exhibit “irrationality” in
terms of an incapacity tomaximize their gains in decision-making
tasks such as the Iowa Gambling Task (Torralva et al., 2007),
are “rational” (albeit in contradiction with the rest of the pop-
ulation) in terms of consistency of choices. This result suggests
interrogations on the descriptive and normative status of princi-
ples of rationality and their relation with neuropsychology. In our
case we can say that VMPFC atrophy seems to be linked to the
absence of deviation from rationality of the type usually entailed
by the Allais paradox. By contrast, it shows that a healthy VMPFC
is an essential neurobiological structure not to be classically
rational.
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